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This  paper  reviews  the  arguments  for  and  against monetary unification in Europe, 
taking into account  the recent shift in emphasis  in the analysis of exchange-
rate  regimes.  It discusses  the merits of  irrevocably fixed versus flexible 
exchange  rates in the light of  the literature on  international  strategic 
interactions,  where  inefficiences arise from  countries'  incentives to pursue 
"beggar-thy-neighbor" policies.  The  paper also discusses  the effects of  the 
exchange-rate  regime  on  inflation.  In the  long  run,  inflation is determined by 
the "credibility" of  the monetary authorities:  the exchange-rate  regime  modifies 
the constraints faced  by  monetary authorities and  thus affects  the  equilibrium 
inflation rate.  The  paper finally discusses monetary unification from  a  public 
finance  perspective:  in some  European countries--particularly in those where 
debt-levels  are  high--money creation is an  important  source government  revenue. 
The  possibility that monetary unification may  substantially cut this source of 
revenue,  and  thus destabilize the  budget,  is an  important argument  against 
monetary uniication. -1-
"Europe  today stands at a  monetary cross-roads.  [ ••• ]The only way  to 
establish a  unified financial  market  is to kill the  sporadic  and  unsettling 
speculation over currency prices that ravages  European  markets  and  permits 
discounts  and  premia  to develop on  currency futures.  [ •.• ]The exchange  rate 
should  be  taken out of both national  and  international politics within Europe." 
[R.  A.  Mundell,  1973] 
1.  Introduction 
The  choice of  the exchange-rate  regime  is a  central  issue in Europe  today. 
The  current system,  the European Monetary System,  has  performed  surprisingly 
well  during  the past nine years.  It has  forced  inflation convergence  starting 
from  very large inflation differentials,  and  it has  survived unprecedented 
swings  in the value of  the dollar.2  To  a  great extent,  however,  the  success of 
the  EMS  must  be  ascribed to the presence of exchange  controls that severely 
limit the possibility of  speculative attacks against central  banks'  reserves. 
The  possibilty of fighting speculative attacks  through  the  imposition of 
exchange  controls has  often enabled central  banks  to postpone parity 
realignments.  This  has  been  a  key factor  in forcing  inflation convergence, 
because  the discipline that the  EMS  imposes  upon  its high inflation members 
requires  that the  interval between  successive  realignments  be  sufficiently long. 
If  high-~nflation countries could realign as  soon  as  higher-than-average 
inflation (combined  with the rigidity of  the  nominal  exchange  rate)  starts 
hurting competitiveness,  the  system would  be  indistinguishable from  a  crawling-
2  On  the  role of  the  EMS  in the European  disinflation see Collins  [1988]  and 
Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  [1989b,  chpt.  4].  On  the  asymmetric  response of 
European  currencies  to dollar fluctuations  see Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  [1986]. -2-
peg:  all discipline gains would  vanish.3  Exchange  controls have  also allowed 
central  banks  to avoid calling a  realignment  during periods of "crisis" in the 
system,  for  example  when  the dollar falls. 
In order  to survive,  the  EMS  has  thus  become  addicted  to a  mechanism  that 
precludes further  financial  integration.  This  is a  major  problem  in view  of  the 
fact that item number  one  on  the policy agenda  in Europe  is the full  integration 
of financial markets.  Will  the  EMS  survive  the  removal  of exchange  controls? 
This  is a  controversial  isstie:  theoretical  analyses  suggest that a  system of 
fixed but adjustable parities cannot  survive in the absence  of a  mechanism  that 
limits  the volume  of  speculative attacks.4  The  recent experiences of 
liberalization have  had  mixed  outcomes.  No  sooner  had  the Italian monetary 
authorities removed  controls on  "leads and  lags"  (in May  1987)  than they were 
faced with a  severe speculative attack.  Because  of  the level  and  maturity 
structure of  the Italian public debt,  the authorities could not  accept a  rise in 
domestic  interest rates large enough  to stop the capital outflow. 5 The  Bank  of 
Italy was  thus  forced  to decide  between  giving in,  and  accepting a  realignment 
that it viewed  as  unwarranted  by  "fundamentals",  or  reintroducing administrative 
controls.  Financial liberalization was  temporarily suspended.  The  French 
experience has  been more  successful  so far,  notwithstanding a  few  attacks on  the 
French  franc.  There  are  two  likely explanations for  such  success.  The  first is 
that France  does  not have  a  public debt  problem,  so  that the French authorities 
3  On  the disciplinary role of  the  EMS  see Melitz  [1988],  Giavazzi and  Pagano 
[ 1988b]. 
4  See  for  example  Wyplosz  [1986],  Driffill [1988],  Obstfeld  [1988]. 
, 5  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  [1988a]  discuss  the link between  the maturity of public 
debt and  the sustainability of fixed excange  rates with perfect capital 
mobility. (2) 
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have  been more  prepared  than the Italian to let domestic  interest rates bear  the 
burden of adjustment.  The  other possible explanation is that foreign lending  in 
domestic  currency is still controlled,  so that the volume  of funds  that can be 
mobilized  to stage  an  attack is limited. 
If full financial  integration remains  the primary political objective in 
Europe,  and  if the current system of fixed  but adjustable parities cannot 
survive full  financial  liberalization,  the choice  is between allowing greater 
exchange-rate flexibility,  or giving up  realignments  altogeher,  moving  toward  a 
system of credible,  and  thus  irrevocably fixed  rates--that is a  monetary union.6 
As  documented  by Mundell,  there exists a  time-honoured  tradition of 
debates  and  analyses of monetary unification in Europe.  The  high point of this 
tradition is the  1975  All  Saints'  Day  Manifesto.  7  The  rationale behind  the 
proposal  to create a  European monetary union rests on  the comparison of 
classical arguments  for  and  against optimal  currency areas.  Among  the 
advantages  of a  common  currency,  the manifesto listed the  informational 
advantages  of using a  common  numeraire;  the efficiency of a  single money  as unit 
6  The  decision to lift capital controls fits well  Richard Cooper's description 
of an  integration strategy:  "Integration as  a  process  involves establishing a 
situation that is not  in long  run equilirium:  partial  integration creates  new 
problems  that,  in turn,  call for  further  integrative measures."  (Cooper 
1976].) 
7  "All  Saints'  Day  Manifesto for  European Monetary Union"  by  G.  Basevi,  M. 
Fratianni,  H.  Giersch,  P.  Korteweg,  D.O'Mahony,  M.  Parkin,  T.  Peeters,  P. 
Salin and  N.  Thygesen,  The  Economist,  November  1,  1975.  The  manifesto 
recommended  that European central  banks  issue a  parallel currency,  Europa, 
against national moneys.  Europa's  exchange  rate would  be  determined  so  that 
the  new  currency would  maintain a  constant purchasing  power  in terms  of  a 
European  basket of goods.  The  purpose  of  this parallel currency was  to 
substitute national  moneys  with a  single money  of stable value.  Currency 
substitution would  have  taken place  spontaneously in the market,  because 
Europa  would  have  offered a  more  stable store of value  and  unit of account. 
This  tradition has  recently been  revived in the papers collected in De  Cecco 
and  Giovannini  [1989]. -4-
of account  and  store of value;  lower  transaction costs in international  trade; 
and  the elimination of  exchange-rate risk.  The  proposal  recognized that the 
social cost of monetary unification would  arise from  the deep  regional diversity 
that exists across Europe.  It therefore  suggested that the institution of  a 
common  currency be  accompanied  by  a  series of supply-side policies,  fiscal 
reforms,  and  transitory income  transfers,  designed to eliminate the causes  of 
regional  imbalances  and  to alleviate the costs of sectorial  shocks  in the 
transition. 
This  paper  reviews  the  arguments  for  and  against monetary unification in 
Europe.  One  motivation for  doing  this  now  has  been discussed above:  irrevocably 
fixed  exchange  rates may  be  the necessary condition to liberalize European 
financial  markets.  Another  motivation is that the emphasis  in the  theoretical 
discussion of exchange-rate  regimes  has  shifted since the early seventies.  The 
effects of strategic interactions among  countries is a  central  issue in present-
day  analysis of exchange-rate  regimes:  it was  rarely found  in the list of  items 
discussed in the  e;arly seventies.  The  way  we  think about  inflation has  also 
changed.  In the early seventies one  of  the  arguments  against  irrevocably fixed 
exchange  rates stated that in such a  regime  countries might  be  forced  to accept 
undesirable positions along  a  stable long-run tradeoff between  inflation and 
unemployment.  Today  we  tend  to think of  the long-run level  of inflation as 
determined  by  the "credibility" of  the monetary authorities:  the choice of the 
exchange-rate  regime  modifies  the constraints faced  by  the monetary authorities 
and  may  thus  modify  the equilibrium inflation rate.  Another  important aspect is 
the  "public-finance" role of inflation.  Since  the early seventies,  budget 
deficits and  public-debt levels have  become  a  major  source  of concern in many 
European  countries.  In some  countries where  debt levels are higher,  money 
creation remains  a  significant source of government  revenue.  The  possibility -5-
that currency unification may  substantially reduce  the  revenue  from  seignorage, 
and  thus  destabilize the budget,  is an  important argument  against a  monetary 
union. 
The  paper  adds  these  items  to  the cost-benefit analysis of a  monetary 
union.  Section 2  discusses  the benefits from  irrevocably fixed  exchange  rates 
in the  light of  the literature on  international strategic interactions.  Section 
3  discusses  the effects of  the exchange-rate  regime  on  the equilibrium level  of 
inflation.  Section 4  discusses  the  role of inflation in public finance,  and  the 
effects of financial  integration.  The  main  conclusions of the paper are 
summarized  in section 5. 
2.  Policv Interactions,  Structural  Asymmetries  and  the Optimality of 
Fixed Exchange  Rates 
The  analysis of international  policy interactions has  added  new  insights  to 
the  comparison of exchange-rate  regimes  by  studying  the world-wide  efficiency 
losses  that arise from  "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies.8  Under  flexible  exchange 
rates a  noncooperative equilibrium is inefficient because  each country perceives 
that it faces  a  more  favorable  output-price level  tradeoff  than it actually 
does.  Each  country sets monetary policy taking its partners'  monetary policy as 
given:  therefore it believes that a  change  in its money  stock can affect the 
exchange  rate.  If the  exchange  rate feeds  back  into domestic  prices  through 
aggregate  supply channels  (imported materials'  prices,  or wage  indexation 
rules),  each central bank  believes  that by  engineering a  real  appreciation it 
can  reduce  the price level at a  comparatively small  cost in terms  of output. 
8  The  literature originates from  Hamada  [1974].  Recent  developments  are 
discussed in Bean  [1985],  Buiter and  Marston  [1985],  Fischer  [1987]. -6-
Following  a  world-wide  negative  supply shock,  for  example,  each country has  an 
incentive  to overcontract money,  but,  if countries are identical,  in equilibrium 
the  exchange  rate does  not move:  the  outcome  is a  lower  level  of output  than 
what  could  be  obtained if countries  had  recognized  the spillover effects of 
domestic  monetary policy. 
The  inefficiency associated with noncooperative equilibria carries  through 
to alternative exchange-rate  regimes.  Consider  for  example  a  two-country world 
in which  one  country (the  N-th  country)  sets monetary policy for  the entire 
region,  while  the other country retains  the  power  to affect the bilateral 
9  exchange  rate.  In such  a  regime  the  two  countries perceive different output-
price level  tradeoffs.  The  N-th country faces  the  region-wide output-price 
level  tradeoff,  and  therefore does  not  attempt  to  run a  "beggar-thy-neighbor" 
policy:  its asymmetric  position at the centre of  the international monetary 
system  removes  the  inefficiency associated with the strategic interaction.  The 
country that retains control  of  the  exchange  rate,  on  the contrary,  will still 
have  an  incentive  to  improve  its output-inflation tradeoff by  affecting  the 
exchange  rate.  The  equilibrium keeps  being characterized by  a  world-wide 
efficiency loss,  but losses  from  lack  o~lnternational cooperation are not 
equally shared by all countries.  The  .country that controls  the  exchange  rate 
can generate domestic  price-level deflation by  changing  the  exchange  rate at the 
expense  of  the  foreign country:  following  a  supply shock it is thus  better off 
than  the  N-th country. 
9  A regime  where  countries manage  their exchange  rates  (by pegging  to a 
numeraire  currency and  adjusting their peg  at will)  is relevant  to study 
experiences  such as  the  Bretton Woods  system.  It is also often argued  (see 
for  example  Emerson  [1982])  that such a  regime  best describes  the working  of 
the  EMS.  Policy interactions under  managed  exchange  rates are  studied in 
Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  [1989a]. -7-
The  analysis  of  noncooperative equilibria points  to the  superiority of 
permanently and  credibly fixed  exchange  rates  in a  world  of  identical countries 
and  identical world  shocks.  Fixed  rates would  reproduce  the outcome  of  a  command 
world  economy,  where  the  inefficiencies stemming  from  countries'  incentives  to 
run "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies are ruled out by  construction.  However,  when 
countries'  macroeconomic  structures differ,  or when  identical countries are hit 
by  asymmetric  shocks,  exchange-rate changes  may  be  the easiest instrument  to use 
for  redistributing the effects of exogenous  disturbances.  Thus,  the  analysys  of 
international  policy interactions points  to an  important  tradeoff which  lies 
behind  the  choice of  the  exchange  rate regime.  On  the one  hand,  the  theoretical 
appeal  of fixed  exchange  rates is that  they eliminate  the  incentive  to use 
inefficient "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies.  On  the other  hand,  in the  absence 
of significant international factor mobility and  of fiscal  redistributions, 
adjustable parities can  be  efficient in the  short  run at evening  out country-
specific  imbalances,  but  can also be  used for  selfish purposes,  at everybody's 
loss. 
In Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  [1987]  we  illustrate the  suboptimality of fixed 
exchange  rates when  realignments  can be  used effectively to counteract external 
shocks.  We  show  for  example  that in the presence of cross-country asymmetries 
in the  intermediate  input-wage-price  transmission mechanism,  common  external 
shocks  are  transmitted unevenly to different countries:  under  these 
circumstances,  exchange-rate  realignments--to  the extent that  they have  some 
real effect--are part of  the  optimal  (centralized)  response  to  the  common 
external  shocks.  What  is the empirical  importance  in Europe  of  asymmetries  in 
the  intermediate  input-wage-price  transmission mechanism?  Some  evidence  is also 
presented  in Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  [1987].  Using  input-output tables for  five 
European  countries we  estimate the aggregate  and  sectorial  response  of domestic -8-
prices  to a  change  in the world  price of materials.  These  estimates are 
interesting in two  respects.  On  the  one  hand,  they permit us  to assess  the cost 
of keeping exchange  rates fixed  in the face  of common  external  shocks  and 
structural  asymmetries.  On  the other hand,  they provide  a  structure for  the 
computation of  the  optimal  (centralized)  setting of  intra-European exchange 
rates  and  monetary policy in the face  of external  shocks.  The  results 
demonstrate  the  empirical  importance  of asymmetric  transmissions of price 
disturbances. 
3.  Inflation and  the Exchange-Rate  Regime 
The  analysis of international strategic interactions discussed in section 2 
assumes  that monetary policy can affect real variables,  at least in the  short 
run.  In doing  so,  it overlooks  the strategic interaction between central  banks 
and  the private sector that takes  place within each country,  and  that may 
undermine  the effectiveness of monetary policy.  This  issue is taken up  in the 
present  section. 
The  observation (originally due  to Kydland  and  Prescott  [1977]  and  Calvo 
[1978],  and  later developed  by  Barro and  Gordon  [1983])  that optimal  plans  may 
be  time-inconsistent has  brought  the credibility and  reputation of monetary 
th  •t•  t  th  t  f  th  1  .  f  .  fl  .  10  Th  b  .  .  .  au  or1  1es  o  e  cen  re o  e  ana  ys1s  o  1n  at1on.  e  as1c  po1nt  1s 
that in the presence of  nominal  wage  contracts,  monetary authorities face  an 
output-inflation tradeoff that is not  the equilibrium one.  Since nominal  wages 
are fixed for  the  time  of  the contract,  monetary authorities have  the  power  to 
affect real  wages  through unanticipated inflation.  If the equilibrium level of 
10  The  problem  of  time-consistency in an  international  setting is addressed,  for 
example,  in Currie and  Levine  [1986],  McKibbin  and  Sachs  [1986],  van  der 
Ploeg  [1987]  among  others. -9-
output is below  the  social  optimum  (for example  because of distortions or 
externalities),  monetary authorities will also have  an  incentive to affect real 
wages.  Because  their power  and  their incentives are public knowledge,  they are 
rationally discounted  by  wage-setters  in forming  their forcasts  of inflation,  so 
that the equilibrium will  have  two  properties:  (a)  monetary authorities do  not 
succeed  in their attempt  to affect real variables  (this is why  the  tradeoff they 
perceive is not  the equilibrium one);  (b)  the expected,  and  actual,  rate of 
inflation is higher  than the inflation rate that would  prevail if the central 
bank  could credibly tie its hands. 
Two  ideas  have  been  proposed in order  to improve  upon  the  inefficiency of 
time-consistent equilibria.  The  first is to modify the preferences of policy-
makers:  this is Rogoff's  [1985a]  idea to appoint  "conservative" central  bankers, 
i.e. officials whose  relative dislike for  inflation exceeds  that of society.  An 
alternative is to modify  the constraints,  rather  than the  preferences,  of 
policymakers.  In an  open  economy,  the exchange-rate  regime  modifies  the 
constraints faced  by  the monetary authorities,  and  may  thus  modify  the 
equilibrium inflation rate.  11  Consider  two  identical countries characterized 
by  a  domestic  inflation inefficiency arising from  the  time-consistency problem 
discussed above.  Under  flexible exchange  rates the  two  central  banks  have  an 
incentive  to try to engineer  a  real  exchange-rate appreciation to disinflate. 
Each  has  an  incentive  to tighten monetary policy to appreciate its currency, 
thus  reducing  domestic  inflation.  This  is the deflationary bias of flexible 
exchange  rates discussed in section 2.  As  noted  by  Rogoff  [1985b],  the presence 
of an externality at the international  level also affects  the  outcome  of  the 
11  Another  possibility is to sustain more  efficient equilibria through 
reputational  mechanisms.  See  for  example  Backus  and  Driffill [1985]. -10-
game  that takes  place  between wage-setters and  the central  bank within each 
country:  the deflationary bias  that arises from  the  incentive  to  run a  "beggar-
thy-neighbor"  policy internationally,  partly offsetts the domestic  inflation 
inefficiency.  What  we  have  is a  typical  second-best situation in which  fixed 
exchange  rates,  by  eliminating the externality associated with  the flexible 
exchange-rate equilibrium,  may  produce  an  inferior outcome. 
Are  there any conditions under  which  fixed  exchange  rates could still help 
alleviate a  domestic  inflationary bias?  Consider  a  fixed exchange-rate  regime 
that works  asymmetrically:  one  central  bank  sets monetary policy for  the entire 
region;  the  other gives  up  monetary  autonomy,  and  passively pegs  the exchange 
rate.  The  result is that both countries will  end  up  with the inflation rate 
that would  prevail  in the centre country if it were  a  closed economy.  If the 
centre country is less inflation-prone  than its partner,  the latter can gain by 
credibly pegging.  There  are  thus  three conditions that must  be  satisfied for 
fixed  exchange  rates  to be  able  to correct a  domestic  inflation inefficiency. 
First,  the fixed  exchange-rate  regime  must  work  asymmetrically:  monetary policy 
for  the entire region must  be  independently set by  the less inflation-prone 
country;  the other countries must  passively accomodate,  thus effectively losing 
all monetary  sovereignty.  Second,  the  "credibility-gap"  between  the centre 
country and  its partners must  be  large,  relative to  the  incentive that central 
banks  have  to affect the  exchange  rate.  Third,  the  committment  to peg  the 
exchange  rate must  be  credible:  this in contrast to  the authorities'  inability 
to precommit  to a  monetary rule under  flexible exchange  rates. 12 
12  The  credibility of  exchange  rate targets is discussed in Giavazzi and 
Giovannini  [1989b,  chpt.  4]. (3) 
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4.  Inflation,  Public Finance  and  Fixed Exchagge  Rates 
If inflation were  only a  source  of inefficiency,  a  regime  of  irrevocably 
fixed  exchange  rates would  be  effective at reducing  the degree  of  inefficiency, 
provided  that it worked  asymmetrically.  The  approach  taken in section 3, 
however,  completely overlooks  the public  finance  role of  inflation.  The  ability 
of governments  to generate  revenue  through money  creation is an  important  item 
in the  design of optimal  monetary policy.  Countries  resolve  to  the  inflation 
tax not  only in extreme  situations when  this becomes  their last resort,  but also 
in more  normal  times,  as  an alternative to  increasing the distortions  induced  by 
the  tax  system;  or  as  a  way  around  the rigidities of  the fiscal-decision 
process;  or  simply as  a  way  around  the difficulties of collecting taxes. 
Differences  in fiscal  structures may  therefore justify differences  in the 
"optimal"  revenue  from  money  creation.  An  important  argument  against 
irrevocably fixed  exchange  rates is thus  the difficulty of agreeing on  the 
optimal  inflation rate for all countries  involved. 1 
The  basic facts  are  summarized  in table  1.  The  data  show  that in those 
European  countries where  tax  revenues  are lower,  the Treasury tends  to finance  a 
larger  share of  the budget  through loans  by  the central  bank.  I  have  emphasized 
the fiscal  asymmetry  across  Europe  by  drawing  a  line between  the  south and  the 
north.  Money  financing  amounts  to 4-5 percent of  GDP  in Portugal,  2-3  percent 
in Greece,  2  percent in Italy;  in Spain there  has  been  a  sharp  turn-around  in 
recent years,  when  money  financing  has  fallen from  1.5 percent of  GDP  to zero. 
In the north of  Europe  money  financing  accounts  for  a  negligible share  of  GDP--
less than one  half of  one  percent. 
1 Dornbusch  [1988a,b]  points  to  the  public finance  role of  inflation as  an 
important factor  in choosing  an  exchange-rate  regime  for  Europe.  Aizenman 
[1987]  derives  explicitly the dependence  of  "optimal"  inflation on  tax-
collection costs. -12-
The  evidence  presented  in Table  1  suggests  that in the  south of Europe  it 
should  be  possible  to reduce  money  financing  by  raising tax revenues  to  the  EEC 
average.  In  some  southern European  countries,  however,  low  tax  revenues  reflect 
the  structure of  the  economy,  and  it is not  clear that they could  be  raised very 
fast.  Low  tax  revenues  often reflect a  narrow  tax-base,  rather  than lower-than-
average  tax rates.  In discussing  the  Greek  economy,  for  example,  the  OECD 
writes:  "There  is [in Greece]  a  relatively heavy  tax burden on  incomes  and 
transactions  that are easily taxable  (wages  and  salaries,  purchases  of cars and 
some  consumer  durables,  real estate and  inheritance transactions).  Tax  evasion 
and  avoidance  are partly responsible,  but  the  most  important factor is the 
structure of  the  economy  characterized by  a  large share of agriculture in GDP 
(18%),  and  of  self-employment  in the non-agricultural  labour  force  (33%)." 
[OECD,  Economic  Survey of  Greece,  1987].  The  case of Portugal  is similar:  "Low 
tax yield is attributable to  the  narrowness  of  the  tax-base,  which  is not 
unrelated  to  the  high marginal  tax-rates."  [OECD,  Economic  Survey of Portugal, 
1986].  In Greece  and  Portugal  raising  taxes  to  reduce  money  financing  may  not 
be  possible without  adding distortions  to the  tax  system. 
The  fiscal  asymmetry  documented  in table  1  raises  two  questions:  (i)  do 
optimal  taxation arguments  justify ~ifferences in the  degree  of money  financing 
across  Europe?  (ii) what  are  the  implications  of  money  financing  for  the 
conduct  of monetary policy and  thus  for  the ability of  the central  bank  to peg 
the  nominal  exchange  rate?  The  two  questions  are closely linked. 
Consider  a  central  bank  that decides  to  join a  monetary system where 
exchange  rates are fixed  and  interest rates are set independently by  a  centre 
country.  A primary source of  concern for  such a  central  bank  is the extent to 
which  the Treasury may  turn to it in order  to finance  the budget.  If capital 
mobility is high,  an  increase  in domestic  credit will  induce  an outflow of -13-
foreign exchange  reserves  and  may  force  the central  bank  to give  up  the  exchange 
rate target.  These  concerns  of central  bankers  reflect the  more  general  point 
(illustrated for  example  in Helpman  and  Razin  [1987],  and  Cumby  and  van 
Wijnbergen  [1987])  that an asymmetric  fixed  exchange  rate regime  not  only 
implies  a  loss of monetary sovereignty,  but  imposes  also a  constraint on  fiscal 
policy:  the menu  of  taxes  and  money  financing  must  be  consistent with  the 
exchange  rate target. 
4.1  Inflation and  Public  Finance 
In a  world  in which  governments  could finance  public expenditure  through 
non-distortionary taxes,  the  optimal  inflation rate would  simply be  the  negative 
of  the  real  interest rate.  At  that level  of  inflation the  nominal  interest rate 
is zero,  and  the cost of carrying over  real  money  balances  equals  the  social 
opportunity cost of  supplying money--namely  zero.  Unfortunately,  governemnts 
must  resort to distortionary taxes  in order  to finance  public  expenditure.  It 
has  long  been  recognized that because  taxes  are distortionary,  it may  be  optimal 
to tax money  balances  to  the  point where  the marginal  welfare cost of  raising 
revenue  through  the  inflation tax equals  the  marginal  welfare cost of  raising 
revenue  through other forms  of taxation.  This  was  first pointed out by  Phelps 
[1972].  The  result,  however,  is by  no  means  uncontroversial.  One  way  to  think 
about it is to look at the  tax rate on  money  as  a  determinant of  the relative 
price of  cash and  credit goods:  if tax rates are set optimally,  it is unclear 
that  the  tax rate on  money  should  be  positive--that is,  that money-using  goods 
should be  taxed more  heavily than credit- or  (barter-)  using goods.  14  However, 
if the  main  existing taxes  are on  some  factor  input,  especially labor, 
14  See  Lucas  [1984],  and  also Drazen  [1979],  Kimbrough  [1986]. -14-
then it may  be  desirable  to  tax all  inputs,  including monetary services. 16 
Another  important  argument  (suggested  for  instance by  Barra  [1988])  is that 
a  positive tax rate on  money  allows  the government  to  tax  some  black-market 
activities where  final  output  escapes  taxation.  The  argument  can be  illustrated 
considering  the  optimal  mix  of money  and  tax financing  for  a  government  whose 
goal  is to minimize  the  expected present value  of  social losses.  Consider  the 
government's  intertemporal  budget constraint: 
b  = (r-n)b +  (g  - T)  - c 
py 
(1) 
where  b  is the  public debt,  as  a  share of  national  income;  r  is the real  rate of 
interest;  n  is  the  growth  rate of  income;  g  is the ratio of government 
expenditure  to  income;  T  the  average  tax rate.  C/(py)  represents credit to the 
government  by  the central  bank,  also as  a  share of  GDP.  Suppose  that velocity 
is constant,  so  that demand  for  money  (currency and  bank  deposits)  can be 
described  by  the  quantity equation: 
M  =  k  (2) 
py 
where  k  is a  constant.  Banking  regulations  and  the  structure of  the  financial 
system determine  the relation between M and  high-powered  money,  H.  We  simply 
describe it as: 
H = g(p)M,  g'>O  (3) 
16  Feldstein's  [1976]  distiction between  "tax design"  (tax laws  being written 
de-novo  on  a  clean sheet of paper),  and  "tax reform"  (taking as  starting 
point  the existing  tax  system and  the fact  that actual  changes  are  slow  and 
piecemeal)  is relevant  on  this point. (4) 
-15-
where  p  is the reserve  requirement  ratio:  for  any given level  of M an  increae in 
required  reserves  raises H.  Substituting from  (3)  for M in (2),  differentiating 
and  neglecting central  bank  intervention in the foreign exchange.market  (so that  . 
C =  H),  we  obtain: 
c 
py  =  g(p)  k  (tr+n) 
(where  1T  is the  rate of inflation)  and  therefore: 
b  ~ (r-n)b +  (g - T)  - g(p)  k  (tr  +  n) 
(4) 
( 1 ') 
From  equation (1') we  see  that different combinations  of tr,  T  and  p  can  be 
used  to finance  any given level  of government  expenditure and  to service  the 
existing stock of debt,  so  as  to keep  the  debt-to-income  ratio constant. 
What  is the  optimal  combination tr,  T  and  p?  Assume  that the  deadweight 
losses  incurred by  taxation and  the  social costs of  inflation are linear in 
17  output.  The  government's objective is: 
min 
lT,  T 
(5) 
where  the functions f(•)  and  h(•)  (with f', h', f'', h'' all positive)  describe 
17  As  Fama  [1980]  and  others  have  argued,  reserve  requirements  have  something  in 
common  with a  tax on  interest on  bank  deposits:  the deadweight  loss  they give 
rise to should  thus  also be  included in equation (5).  Romer  [1988]  shows 
however  that such a  proposition is not necessarily true.  In what  follows  I 
overlook  the possible distortions associated with reserve  requirements. -16-
the  social losses per unit of  output associated with  the  two  forms  of  raising 
revenue.  The  government  minimizes  (5)  subject  to  (1')  and  to a  transversality 
condition that  rules  out  indefinite accumulation of public debt.  The  ratio of 
the  two  static first-order conditions  of  the  optimal  taxation programme  is: 18 
h'[(u)] 
f'((T)) 
= 
g(p)ky 
y 
= g(p)k  (6) 
The  ratio of  the marginal  social  cost of  inflation to  the  marginal  deadweight 
loss  of  taxation is equal  to the  ratio of  the  two  tax bases:  y  for  taxation and 
g(p)ky = (H/p)y for  inflation.  For  given  tax  bases,  equation  (6)  implies--as 
well  known--that  the  two  tax  rates are positively related.  For  instance if 
permanent  expenditure  rises,  both  tax  rates  have  to  increase. 19 
Equation  (6)  has  important  implications  for  the  design of  an  optimal  tax 
programme.  Consider first the  case  of  tax evasion.  In  the  presence of  an 
h 
underground  economy  wfore  transactions  are  settled in cash and  escape  taxation, 
the  two  real  income  terms  that appear  on  the  numerator  and  on  the  denominator  of 
the  right-hand-side of  equation  (6)  measure  quite different phenomena,  and  their 
ratio is proportional  to  the  relative size of  the  underground  economy.  For  a 
given velocity of  high-powered  money,  the  marginal  cost  of  inflation relative  to 
taxation should  be  higher  in countries where  the  phenomenon  of  tax evasion is 
more  widespread.  The  intuition runs  as  follows.  The  larger is  the  tax  base, 
18  The  intertemporal  first-order  conditions  of  this problem describe  the  "tax-
smoothing"  property of optimal  fiscal  policy,  as  discussed  in Barro  [1979]. 
Mankiw  [1987]  shows  that allowing  velocity to  respond  to  the  rate of 
inflation does  not  modify  the  basic point of equation  (6). 
19  This  of  course  depends  on  the  assumption of  increasing marginal  costs. 
Pagano  [1988]  discusses  the  solution of  the  optimal  tax  problem allowing 
inflation and  tax rates  to affect  the  level  of  output. -17-
the  larger is  the  revenue  raised with a  given  tax rate:  since distortions only 
0"" 
depend/tax  rates,  a  larger  tax  base optimally justifies a  larger distortion. 
Whether  this also  implies  that the  ratio of  u  to  T should  be  higher  in countries 
where  tax  evasion is a  relatively more  important  phenomenon,  depends  on  the  form 
of  the  f  and  h  functions:  it would  be  true if for  example  [h(u)+f(T)]  were 
homogeneous. 
Consider  next  the  effect of  an  increase  in the  social  cost of  inflation. 
From  equation  (6),  when  the  ratio of  the  two  marginal  costs rises,  so  should  the 
ratio of  the  two  tax  bases.  An  optimal  response  to  an  upward  shift in h'  is 
thus  an  increase  in the  base  of  the  inflation tax.  This  can  be  accomplished  by 
raising  reserve  requirements. 20  An  increase  in reserve  requirements  is indeed 
often observed at  the  outset of  a  disinflation.  Figures  1  and  2  document  the 
Q.i\1\o( 
increase  in reserve  requirements  in Italy,  Greece,jSpain  in the 
early 1980s. 21  When  Italy joined  the  EMS  marginal  reserve  requirements  were 
22  raised  in a  few  years  from  15  and  3/4  to  25  percent;  in Spain average  reserve 
requirements  were  below  10  percent  up  to  1982,  and  jumped  to  25  percent  in  1983; 
in Greece  average  reserve  requirements  were  also raised from  12  to  almost  30 
percent  in the early 1980s.  In each country  the  timing  of  the  increase  in 
reserve  requirements  corresponds  to a  policy shift aimed  at stabilizing the 
20  I  h  t  .  .  .  t  .  th  t  b  assume  t  a  an  1ncrease  1n  reserve  requ1remen  s  ra1ses  e  mone  ary  ase. 
21 
22 
If the  demand  for  deposits  is very sensisite to  the  interest rate on 
deposits,  an  increase  in reserve  requirements  could lower  the  monetary  base 
(see for  instance  Calvo  and  Fernandez  [1983].)  For  a  recent  review of  the 
literature on  seigniorage  and  reserve  requirements  see  Spaventa  [1989]. 
The  figures  plot total  reserves  (including free  reserves) at end  of  period, 
as  percent of  bank  deposits,  as  available  from  the  I.M.F.  International 
Financial Statistics.  More  recent data  on  reserve  requirements  are  reported 
in Table  2. 
For  an  analysis  of  the  Italian experience  see  Bruni et al.  [1988]. -18-
price level.  As  discussed  in section 3,  a  disinflation is often associated with 
a  change  in the  preferences of  the  monetary authorities--be it the  appointfment 
of a  "conservative" central  banker  or  the decision  to peg  the  exchange  rate  to  a 
low-inflation country.  Both  cases  can  be  described  as  an  increase  in the 
relative cost of  inflation in the authorities'  objective function. 
4.2 Monetary Financing  and  the  Conduct  of Monetary Policy 
The  view  that central  banks  in southern Europe  may  have  used  (perhaps  even 
"optimally")  reserve  requirements  to widen  the  inflation tax  base  in the 
presence  of  a  falling  inflation tax rate is attractive.  Table  2  shows  that  the 
increase  in reserve  requirements  that occurred  in each of  the  four  countries 
(Italy,  Greece,  Spain and  Portugal)  in the early 1980s  was  not,  at least fully, 
offset  by  a  fall  in bank  deposits,  and  thus  produced  an  increase  in the  ratio of 
base  money  to  GDP. 
This  view  however  runs  into  two  difficulties.  The  first is  that  bank 
reserves  in these countries  pay  some  interest--5.5 percent for  example  in Italy. 
The  implicit tax rate  thus falls along with  the fall  in inflation and  in nominal 
interest rates.  Table  3  shows  the  implicit  tax  rate and  the  corresponding  tax 
revenues  in the case of Italy.  In  the late  1970s  and  early 1980s,  when  the 
difference  between  the  lending rate and  the  interest rate paid  on  bank  reserves 
was  above  10  percent,  the  yearly tax revenue  was  above  1  percent of  GDP;  in 
1986-87,  when  the  interest rate wedge  became  much  smaller,  the  revenue  fell  to 
less  than one  half of one  percent of  GDP. 23 
The  second difficulty is that central  banks  provide quite different 
motivations  for  their decision to raise reserve  requirements.  According  to  the 
23  In Spain  too  reserves  pay  an  interest,  that is a  fraction of  the  market  rate. 
Gros ..  [1988]  also points  to  the  role of  the  interest paid  on  bank  reserves. -19-
Bank  of Italy,  for  instance,  "an increase  in the  reserve coefficient was 
necessary in order  to  reduce  the value of  the bank multiplier and  dampen  the 
impact  of disturbances originating from  central  bank  lending to the Treasury."24 
These  motivations  suggest that it is important  to draw  a  distinction between 
Treasury access  to  the central bank  and  money  creation:  the  important question 
is not whether  the central  bank  is obliged to lend to  the Treasury,  but whether, 
given that obligation, it is still in a  position to conduct  a  monetary policy, 
and  whether  the ability to use  reserve  requirements  provides  an  additional 
.  t  t  25  1ns  rumen  • 
Changes  in reserve  requirements  affect the multiplier,  and  can  thus  be  used 
to control  the money  supply.  From  equation (3): 
dM  =  -H(g'/g)dp +  (1/g)  dH  (7) 
(1/g)  is the multiplier:  an  increase in p  reduces  the multiplier.  Equation  (7) 
·shows  the  two  effects of  a  change  in reserve  requirements.  An  increase in p--as 
in Spain and  Italy from  the late seventies  to the mid-eighties--allows  the 
central  bank  to sterilize its lending  to  the Treasury (this is  the first term in 
equation (7).)  At  higher values of the  reserves coefficient,  the variance of 
the money  supply is lower  for  any given variance of credit creation by  the 
Treasury (this is the  second  term  in the equation.)  Reserve  requirements  can 
24  Banca  d'Italia,  La  Mobilizzazione della Riserva Obbligatoria:  Motivazioni  e 
Indicazioni,  Rome,  October  1988. 
25  Distinguishing between  the Treasury and  the central  bank  may  however  be 
misleading in situations where  the Treasury is able  to shift expenditure  to 
the central  bank.  In Turkey,  for  instance,  a  substantial part of  the 
interest payments  on  the government's  foreign debt  is handled directly by  the 
central  bank  without  being  recorded in the government's  budget.  See  Van 
Wijenbergen et al.  [1988]. -20-
thus  shelter the central  bank  from  the effects of its obligation to  lend  to  the 
Treasury.  However,  since  p  is bounded,  reserve  requirements  cannot  be  used 
indefinitely.  Over  time,  as  p  stabilizes,  the  only effect is to  reduce  the 
variance  of  the  money  supply. 
The  possibility to use  bank  reserves  to sterilize central  bank  lending  to 
the Treasury can  be  seen even more  clearly rewriting equation  (7)  in the 
following  form: 
dM/M- dp/p  =  (C/H)dC/C- [(R/H)(dp/p- r)  +  (Cu/H)dp/p  +  ~ dp/p]  (7') 
where  I  have  assumed  that a  fixed  rate of  interest r  is paid  on  bank  reserves. 
C denotes,  as  above,  central  bank  lending  to  the Treasury,  and  R and  Cu  the  two 
components  of  the  monetary base,  bank  reserves  and  currency respectively;  dp/p 
is  the  inflation rate,  and  ~ the elasticity of  the multiplier with  respect  to  a 
change  in the  reserve coefficient.  The  first  two  terms  that  appear  in the 
square  brackets  are  the  seigniorage  on  currency and  bank  reserves,  respectively; 
the last term  measures  the effect of  a  change  in reserve  requirements. 
Consider first a  steady state with constant  reserve  requirements  and  with 
r=O.  From  equation (7')  (C/H)dC/C  = dM/M  =  dp/p:  Treasury borrowing  from  the 
central  bank  determines  the  rate of money  growth  (overlooking  the effects of 
central  bank  intervention in the  foreign  exchange  market),  itself equal  to  the 
rate of  inflation.  Consider  now  a  change  in monetary  regime,  for  example  a 
26  disinflation driven by  a  reduction in the  growth  rate of money.  If the 
26  Alternatively equation (7')  could  be  used  to  study the  shift  toward  a  fixed 
exchange  rate  regime  run  by  a  "low inflation" country.  With  fixed  exchange 
rates  and  high capital mobility money  demand  is exogenous,  and  the  excess  of 
central  bank  lending  to  the Treasury over  the growth  rate of money  demand 
results  in a  loss of foreign  exchange  reserves. -21-
Treasury does  not  a~st the  amount  it borrows  from  the central  bank,  the latter 
has  only two  options.  It can sterilize through an  open  market  operation,  or it 
can  adjust  the  term  in square  brackets  on  the  right-hand-side of equation (7'): 
this  can  be  done  changing  reserve  requirements. 
There  are  two  reasons  why  the central  bank  may  decide  not  to  run  an  open 
market  operation.  First,  if the  financial  system  is not  well  developed,  there 
may  be  no  market:  this  was  the case  in Italy in the mid-seventies  when  reserve 
requirements  were  first increased.  Second,  the central  bank  may  want  to avoid 
accompanying  the  shift in monetary  regime  with a  build-up of public debt. 
There  is,  however,  a  limit to  the ability to use  reserve  requirements  as  a 
substitute for  open  market  operations:  eventually the  increase  in p will  have  to 
stop;  moreover,- if reservespay a  fixed  interest--as for  instance  in Italy--when 
inflation falls1 so  does  the  seigniorage attached  to bank  reserves.27  For  some 
ti~e,  however,  the  use  of  reserve  requirements  allows  the  central  bank  to  run  a 
monetary policy consistent with  the  new  monetary  regime  even  before  the menu  of 
taxes  and  money  financing  has  been  set consistently with  the  new  regime,  and 
without  putting additional  ~ressure on  public debt.  If the central  bank  can set 
reserve  requirements,  a  reduction in the  degree  of money  financing  is no  longer 
a  precondition for  the shift in monetary  regime. 
This  has  clearly been  the experience of Italy since  the start of  the  EMS. 
In the mid-eighties--1983  to  1985--when  the  reserve  ratio was  growing  at one 
percent per  year,  and  the interest rate paid on  bank  reserves was  6  percentage 
points  below  the  inflation rate,  the  Bank  of Italy was  able  to sterilize through 
27  If reserves  pay  no  interest the  tax  on  bank  deposits will  eventually reduce 
the  role of  banks  as  financial  intermediaries  and  thus  also  the  revenue 
attached  to  bank  reserves.  The  experience  of  the  southern European  countries 
shows  that this may  be  a  long  process  provided you  do  not  allow foreign  banks 
to operate  in the  domestic  market  subject  to  home  reserve  requirements. -22-
bank  reserves  two  thirds of its total lending  to  the Treasury,  equal  on  average 
to  2  percent of  GDP  per year.  Another  third was  sterilized through  the  increase 
in demand  for  currency (the middle  term  in equation (7'.) 
4.3  Inflation,  fixed  exchange  rates and  financial  liberalization 
The  bottom line of  the  previous  two  sections  is that in countries where 
money  financing  is a  relatively important  source of  revenue,  a  shift to a  less 
expansionary monetary  regime  implies  a  choice  between  higher  taxes  now  and 
higher  taxes  in the future,  and  if it is  "now",  between different types  of 
taxes.  If the  tax base  is relatively small,  and  (at least in the  short  run)  tax 
revenues  can only be  increased  by  raising marginal  tax  rates,  it may  be  optimal 
not  to shift at once  the  entire burden of  the  fiscal  correction on  explicit 
taxes.  An  increase  in reserve  requirements  can avoid  building up  a  debt  problem 
in the  transition. 
The  analysis  of  the  role of  bank  reserves  has  important  implications for 
the  plans  to create a  unified market  for  financial  services  in Europe.  If 
reserve  requirements  work  like a  tax  on  the  interest paid on  bank  deposits, 
banks  subject  to relatively higher  reserve  requirements  would  tend  to go  out of 
business:  it would  be  difficult to keep  different  reserve  requirements  in an 
integrated financial  market. 
In countries  such  as  Greece  and  Portugal,  where  inflation is still 
relatively high,  it may  be  unwise  to erase  reserve  requirements  as  a  policy 
instrument and,  at the  same  time,  suggest  a  shift in monetary  regime.  On  the 
contrary,  in countries  such  as  Italy,"where  the shift in monetary  regime  has 
already occurred,  and  where  the possibility to use  bank  reserves  as  a  buffer  in 
the  transition appears  to  have  been exhausted,  the  setting of  reserve 
requirements  at  the  European  average  would,  at this point,  have  only minor 
effects,  subtracting no  more  than one  half of one  percent of  GDP  to  the  budget. -23-
In  the case of Italy,  however,  a  long  transition--ten years  since  the start 
of  the  EMS--seems  not  to have  been  sufficient for  the  adjustment  in fiscal 
policy required by  the  new  monetary  regime.  As  the  safety nets  provided  by 
exchange  controls  and  reserve  requirements  have  become  less effective,  debt 
started to accumulate.  This  brings  us  back  to the question about  the optimality 
of  common  inflation rates  throughout  Europe  discussed at the  beginning of this 
section. 
5.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  paper  has  analyzed  some  of  the merits  and  of  the difficulties of  a 
transition toward  fixed  exchange  rates  in Europe.  The  motivation for  such an 
analysis was  the observation that  the  real  "shock of  1992"  will  come  from  the 
integration of financial  markets:  financial  integration is inconsistent with  the 
current  system of  fixed  but adjustable parities.  The  main  points of  the  paper 
can be  summarized  as  follows: 
(1)  the analysis of international  policy interactions points  to an  important 
tradeoff which lies behind  the choice of  the  exchange  rate regime.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  theoretical  appeal  of fixed  exchange  rates is that  they eliminate  the 
incentive to use  "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies.  On  the other hand,  in the 
absence  of significant international  labor mobility and  of fiscal 
redistributions,  adjustable parities can be  efficient in the  short  run at 
evening out country-specific  imbalances,  but can also be  used  for  selfish 
purposes,  at everybody's  loss; 
(2)  for  fixed  exchange  rates  to be  able  to correct the  inflationary bias  of  the 
more  inflation-prone countries  in Europe,  the exchange-rate  regime  must  work -M-
asymmetrically.  Monetary policy for  the entire region must  be  independently set 
by  the least inflation-prone member  of  the  group;  the  other countries must 
~ 
passively acco,Odate,  thus effectively loosening monetary sovereignty.  This 
point  has  important  implications for  the  organization of  a  European central 
bank; 
(3)  the  analysis of  the  public finance  role of  inflation,  and  the  evidence  on 
fiscal  asymmetries,  point  to  the  risks of  a  change  in monetary  regime  in 
countries characterized by  a  relatively small  tax  base  and  a  relatively large 
ratio of  money  financing  to  tax  revenues. -25-
Table  1 
The  Fiscal Asymmetry 
Monetary  Financing  Tax  Revenue 
of  the  Budget  (percent of  GDP) 
(percent of  GOP) 
1976-87  1984-87  1976-86  1984-86 
Portugal  5.3  4.5  29.6  32.0 
Greece  3.0  2. 1  30.9  35.6 
Italy(  a)  2. 1  2.2  31.2  35.3 
Italy(b)  1. 8  1. 8  n.a.  n.a. 
Spain  1. 5  -0.5  25.4  29.5 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ireland  0.5  0.7  35.8  39.5 
France  0.4  0.2  41.8  44.4 
Belgium  0. 1  0.4  44.5  46.1 
Germany  0.0  -0.0  37.6  37.6 
Netherlands  0.06  0.0  45.1  45.2 
Denmark  0.6  -3.4  45.4  49.0 
United Kingdom  -0.4  -0.3  36.4  38.5 
Source:  Monetary financing  is the  change  in central  bank's  claim on  the 
government  (line  12a  of  IFS).  Money  financing  for  Italy is computed  as  a  share 
of  GOP  according  to:  (a)  the  old national  income  accounts,  and  (b)  the  new 
national  income  accounts.  Tax  revenues  are  from  the  OECO,  Revenue  Statistics 
of  OECO  Member  Countries;  they refer  to total  tax  revenues,  including taxes  on 
personal  and  corporation income,  employers'  and  employees'  social  security 
contributions,  property taxes,  consumption  taxes  and  excises. -26-
Table  2 
Base  Money,  Currency and  Bank  Reserves 
(percent of  GDP) 
Monetary  Currency  Bank 
Base  Reserves 
1981  1987  1981  1987  1981  1987 
Portugal  25.0  27.8  12.5  9.2  12.5  18.6 
Greece  22.6  25.5  12.9  10.1  9.7  15.4 
Italy  15. 1  15.2  6.3  5.5  8.8  9.7 
Spain  13.6  22.6  7.8  7.7  5.8  14.9 
Ireland  9.9  8.7  6.5  5.6  3.4  3. 1 
France  6.0  5.6  5.1  4.3  0.9  1.3 
Belgium  10.6  8. 1  10. 1  7.7  0.5  0.4 
Germany  9.8  10.4  5.5  6.2  4.3  4.2 
Netherlands  6.6  8.1  6.3  7.6  0.3  0.5 
Denmark  3.7  3.5  3.5  3.0  0.3  0.5 
United  Kingdom  5.1  4.2  4.2  3.4  0.9  0.8 
Source:  IMF,  IFS. 
Reserve  Requirements  of  Commercial  Banks 
(percent of  demand  deposits  in banks,  mid-1988) 
Italy 
Spain 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Greece 
25.0 
18.0 
15.0 
1. 0 
7.5 
Germany 
France 
6.6-12.1 
5.0 
United  Kingdom 
Belgium 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
0.5 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Source:  J.P.  Morgan,  World  Financial  Markets,  1988,  no.5. 
In Spain,  Italy and  Greece  required  reserves  are  temunerated  to  some  degree.  In 
Italy 251  percent  is  the  marginal  rate.  The  average  rate is 20  percent. -27-
Table  3 
Italy:  The  Tax  on  Bank  Reserves 
Reserves  Interest Rate  Implicit Tax  Tax  Revenue 
(%  of  bank  Wedge  Rate  (%  of  GDP) 
deposits) 
1976-81  14.9  13.5  1. 75  1.35 
1982-85  17.6  14.7  2.19  1.15 
1986-87  20.1  9. 1  1. 55  0.40 
Sources:  Pagano  [1988].  The  interest rate wedge  is  the  difference  between  the 
lending  rate and  the  interest rate paid  on  reserves.  The  implicit  tax  rate is 
the  product of  the wedge  times  the  reserve  ratio. -28-
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